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It is a universal phenomenon that the socio-economic progress of a state is 
significantly dependent upon the performance of the energy sector, as the energy sector 
drives the engine of growth and development in agricultural, industrial, and defense 
sectors, in addition to impacting domestic users. In Pakistan, the increasing gap between 
the demand for, and the supply of, energy has brought economic progress to a standstill. 
A number of industries have been closed due to this increasing gap, which is expected to 
grow even further.  
Despite huge indigenous potential and its geographical significance as a potential 
energy corridor between the Middle East and Central Asia, Pakistan’s energy sector fails 
to secure its energy needs. The goal of this thesis is to evaluate why Pakistan’s energy 
crisis is worsening day by day, and how the country can best secure its energy needs. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis explores the question, why has Pakistan not been able to achieve 
energy security? It is a universal phenomenon that the socio-economic progress of a state 
is significantly dependent upon the performance of the energy sector, as the energy sector 
drives the engine of growth and development in agricultural, industrial, and defense 
sectors, in addition to impacting domestic users. In Pakistan, the increasing gap between 
the demand for and the supply of energy has brought economic progress to a standstill. A 
number of industries have been closed due to this increasing gap, which is expected to 
grow even further in the future. Despite huge indigenous potential and its geographical 
significance as a potential energy corridor between the Middle East and Central Asia, 
Pakistan’s energy sector fails to secure its energy needs. The goal of this thesis is to 
evaluate why Pakistan’s energy crisis is worsening day by day and how the country can 
best secure its energy needs. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
This study bears undeniable implications on the country’s growing economy. In 
Pakistan, the energy crisis is the single largest drain on the economy, which cuts gross 
domestic product progress by more than 2 percent each year.1 This crisis stems from the 
policy of fuel mix transformation introduced almost 20–25 years ago, when imported 
furnace oil became the primary source of power generation, rather than a greater 
diversification of energy. With over a 9 percent annual increase in energy demand, total 
demand has increased four times in the last two decades. This amount is likely to double 
in the next decade and a half, that is, by 2030.2 
                                                 
1 Elizabeth Mills, “Pakistan’s Energy Crisis,” Journal of Peace Works, United States Institute of Peace 
79, no. 4 (June 2012): 7. Mills is a freelance consultant with a focus on energy, environmental, and 
geopolitical issues. She has written about South Asia for more than a decade and has lived and worked in 
the region.  
2 Shoukat Hameed Khan, “Pakistan’s Energy Vision 2030,” in Solutions for Energy Crisis in Pakistan, 
ed. Mushir Anwar (Islamabad, Pakistan: Islamabad Policy Research Institute, 2013), 217.  
 2 
Various studies on the impact of energy security conducted by the International 
Energy Agency (IEA) and other energy-related international institutions indicate that 
energy availability has an undeniable bearing on the economic progress and stability, 
quality of life, good governance, and outcome of the overall security environment.3 As a 
result, global demand for energy is “expected to double by 2050 as compared with 2000 
levels, and 90 percent of growth in energy demand will be driven by emerging economies 
as more people move out of poverty, demanding more energy and gaining access to it.”4 
Therefore, securing energy needs from existing fossil fuels, while discovering new and 
sustainable forms of energy to meet growing energy needs, is the new “great game” of 
the day. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The primary objective of this thesis is to determine why Pakistan has been unable 
to address ever-increasing energy shortfalls. In my preliminary research, I have examined 
a wide range of peer-reviewed literature, academic journals, government-sponsored 
studies, and literature on energy seminars. These touch upon different aspects of the 
topic, but what I perceive is lacking in scholarship is an approach to analyze Pakistan’s 
energy basket as a whole, along with political, regional, and global implications. Current 
literature reveals that energy poverty is a diverse, long-standing, and multifaceted issue. 
However, economists regard it as an issue of only circular debts.5 Elizabeth Mills, an 
expert on energy and environmental issues, has described Pakistan’s energy problems as 
follows: “For the political observers, it is an issue of absent political will. For the aid 
                                                 
3 Vladislav Vucetic and Achilles G. Adamantiades, “Power Sector Reforms in Pakistan: Issues and 
Challenges,” in Fueling the Future: Meeting Pakistan’s Energy Needs in the 21st Century, ed. Robert M. 
Hathaway, Bhumika Muchhala, and Michael Kugelman (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 
March 2007), 113.  
4 Hamid Hasan Mirza, “An Overview of Pakistan’s Energy Sector: Policy Perspective,” in Solutions 
for Energy Crisis in Pakistan, ed. Mushir Anwar (Islamabad, Pakistan: Islamabad Policy Research 
Institute, 2013), 13. 
5 Circular debt refers to a structural problem in Pakistan’s energy market. It arises when one party, in 
this case, the government, withholds payments. This affects others in the supply chain, notably the power-
generating companies, with each in turn withholding payments. This results in operational problems for the 
sector’s service providers, ensuring that power availability drops. According to the 2010 Pakistan Energy 
Yearbook, five of twenty-two of the country’s independent power producers failed to produce electricity in 
2009, and the rest operated at a capacity of just 60 percent. It is likely that circular debt issues were at least 
partly responsible for this situation.  
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organization specialist, it is a governance problem. For the engineer, it is a matter of 
resolving technical problems, improving energy conservation, and addressing issues like 
theft and nonpayment of electricity bills.”6 The aforementioned problems are logical, yet 
regional energy and geopolitics are important additional factors that seriously impact 
Pakistan’s current energy scenario. This situation is a testimony to the country’s inability 
to capitalize on regional energy resources. Therefore, the review of literature can be 
summarized as follows.  
1. Current Energy Situation 
Pakistan is entangled in a severe and lingering energy crisis, which besides 
impacting life for the average citizen is also affecting the economic cycle of the state. 
Despite having installed energy capacity beyond peak time requirements, exceptionally 
high tariffs make energy unaffordable for domestic users and uneconomical for 
commercial purposes.7 There are also a number of factors which make the system inept 
to deliver the goods and, as a result, energy produced is not sufficient to meet the 
demand. In a few decades, Pakistan’s energy demand has increased about 80 percent, 
with unsustainable supply catching up to the demand.8 As a result, in electricity alone, 
Pakistan is experiencing a gap of almost 5,000–6,000 megawatts (MW), which is almost 
33–35 percent of the total requirement.9 It is important to note that considerable numbers 
of the population either do not have access to grid electricity or use non-commercial 
sources of electricity. 
Unfortunately domestic energy supplies are gradually diminishing.10 In particular, 
the available oil and gas resources are forecast to be exhausted between 2025 and 2030, 
                                                 
6 Mills, “Pakistan’s Energy Crisis,” 23. 
7 Mushir Anwar, ed., Solutions for Energy Crisis in Pakistan (Islamabad, Pakistan: Islamabad Policy 
Research Institute, 2013), 87. 
8 Khan et al., “Measures for Reducing Transmission and Distribution Losses of Pakistan,” 
International Journal of Scientific and Engineering Research 4, no. 4 (April 2013): 617.  
9 Ahmad Fraz Khan, “Power Shortfall Increases to Over 5,000MW,” Dawn, April 22, 2011. 
10 The domestic energy sources consist of natural gas, hydel power, about one-third of our crude oil 
supply, and small quantities of coal and nuclear energy. 
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respectively.11 Analysts suggest that because of Pakistan’s inability to develop 
indigenous energy sources, its import bill may shoot up to and even beyond 75 percent by 
the mid-2020s.12 Subsidizing fuel costs, partially to ease the financial burden on the 
population but mainly to survive against public frustration, has further stressed the state’s 
already crippled economy. According to a recent statement by Pakistan’s federal finance 
minister, the state has to release approximately one trillion rupees annually to make up 
for the subsidies and losses of state-owned power companies.13  
 The State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) has already cautioned the federal government 
of dire economic consequences if tangible measures to secure energy needs are not taken 
on priority basis.14 The textile industry, the mainstay of Pakistan’s gross domestic 
product (GDP) with the biggest chunk in exports, has stumbled due to the power crisis. 
Tariffs on available marginal energy have resulted in high manufacturing costs. Lack of 
required energy has affected the services equally. The rail industry, considered to be the 
most efficient means of transportation, has limited its operations on most routes, reduced 
the number of routes, and even contemplated a complete shutdown of operations due to 
fuel shortages. As for employment, according to one estimate, “4.1 million jobs and 
employment opportunities have been lost since 2008 due to the country’s energy 
problems—roughly 7.5 percent of the workforce.”15 
2. Political and Policy Issues 
Review of available literature reveals that there is a significant acknowledgment 
of the severity of the energy crisis. Numerous high-level committees of think tanks have 
been constituted to formulate an all-inclusive and cohesive energy policy for the country, 
but there has always been an absolute failure to galvanize the effort and translate policy 
                                                 
11 Mills, “Pakistan’s Energy Crisis,” 27. 
12 Zeeshan Javaid, “Energy Crisis Affecting Social, Economic Uplift,” Daily Times, September 7, 
2011. 
13 Sohail Iqbal Bhatti, “Finance Ministry cut Subsidy to power consumers by Rs60 bn,” Dawn, August 
12, 2014. 
14 Javed Mirza, “Energy Crisis to Weigh Heavy on Economic Growth Prospects,” The News, January 
1, 2012. 
15 “Ex-Minister to Defense RPP Contracts in SC,” Dawn, October 29, 2011. 
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into action. The energy sector has long been affected by ad-hoc decision-making by the 
government. The absence of single-energy regulatory authority further compounds the 
issue:  
Important issues such as the close linkage between various forms of 
energy, the affordability and sustainability of energy supplies, the linkage 
between choice of technologies and resultant cost of energy etcetera never 
received the attention of our policy makers and planners in the absence of 
a comprehensive policy. Piece-meal policies, … formulated to meet urgent 
short-term needs, were neither adequate nor effective for ensuring energy 
security for the country.16 
Some challenges require political will and developing consensus, while others necessitate 
substantial financing and institutional corrective measures.  
Many studies suggest a time frame Pakistan could take to tackle the energy issue. 
Chapter 9 of Planning Commission of Pakistan, Vision 3030 also speaks volumes about 
energy security. In 2007 an energy framework was formulated, in consultation with 
hundreds of experts, by the Planning Commission of Pakistan under then-Prime Minister 
Shoukat Aziz. Today, plans and progress are far apart: The situation on the ground is 
much worse. Similarly, during 2013 elections, electricity was the major agenda of the 
Pakistan Muslim League (PML), the sitting ruling party. PML made numerous 
contradicting promises with different timelines to address this issue, but unfortunately, it 
remained more of a political stunt than a resolve.17 For example, “the Asian Development 
Bank (ADB) report, published in 2010, argued that with swift action Pakistan could be on 
the right energy trajectory within three years.”18 On the other hand, while inaugurating a 
404 MW Uch-II power plant at Dera Murad Jamali (Baluchistan Province) on April 25, 
2014, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif claimed that the energy crisis would be overcome in 
three years.19 A year later, on March 22, 2015, the prime minister said in a public address 
                                                 
16 Hamid Hasan Mirza, “An Overview of Pakistan’s Energy Sector,” 7. 
17 It was hoped that Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) would place a greater priority on 
addressing the country’s energy problems than the current government. This is due to the party’s pro-
business focus and moves it has made in Punjab to alleviate power shortages. 
18 Asian Development Bank, Pakistan: Energy Sector Restructuring Program, February 2014, 
http://www.adb.org/documents/pakistan-energy-sector-restructuring-program-0. 
19 “Energy crisis will be overcome in three years,” Geo News, April 25, 2014, accessed November 16 
2015, http://www.geo.tv/article-145712-Energy-crisis-will-be-overcome-in-three-years-PM-Nawaz-.  
 6 
that “most of his government’s time is consumed in tackling terrorism and the acute 
energy crisis which leaves little time for development works.”20 The government’s claims 
have always lacked any viable implementation strategy. 
From the review of literature, it can be concluded that Pakistan urgently requires 
an all-encompassing, futuristic, and implementable energy policy. Policies framed over a 
period of time mostly focus on short-term solutions and fall prey to bureaucratic, rather 
than national, interests. Unfortunately, a desirable, comprehensive energy plan is still not 
on the horizon. Ioannis N. Kessides writes, “Pakistan’s energy bankruptcy is ultimately 
due to massive institutional and governance failure.”21 
3. Regional and Global Aspects 
Existing literature reveals that a stable and prosperous Pakistan is crucial to 
preserving harmony and facilitating regional progress in South Asia. Benefitting from its 
geostrategic significance as a junction to and between regional countries, it can serve as 
an energy pivot as well as an energy corridor; see Figure 1. Unfortunately, such 
transnational energy projects come with a flip side of the story. Elizabeth Mills explains 
its significance: “How Pakistan pursues its regional energy options … will either increase 
potentially destabilizing geopolitical competition among regional actors or contribute to 
new collaboration, strengthening regional ties.”22 If handled sensibly, economic 
opportunities in transnational projects may resolve the regional security dilemma, 
stabilize the region, and ultimately contribute towards global peace. 
                                                 
20 Nawaz Sharif, “Terrorism, Power Issues Keep Nawaz Perplexed,” Dawn News, March 22, 2015, 
http://dawnnews.pk/.   
 21 Ioannis N. Kessides, “Chaos in Power: Pakistan’s Electricity Crisis,” Energy Policy 55, no. C 
(2013): 275, http://econpapers.repec.org/article/eeeenepol/v_3a55_3ay_3a2013_3ai_3ac_3ap_3a271-
285.htm.    
22 Mills, “Pakistan’s Energy Crisis,” 4. 
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Figure 1.  Geostrategic Significance 
 
Pakistan sits on the crossways between China and the Middle East and between South 
and Central Asia. Therefore, forming partnerships in the regional energy market makes 
sense in terms of securing their own energy needs and at the same time benefiting from 
the transit royalties. Source:Shafiq-ur-Rehman, “GeoStratigic Impportance of Pakistan,” 
January 21, 2014. www.primeinstitute.org/uploads/.../pak-china_economic_corridor-
_1.pdf.   
However, in regard to energy solutions, it is easier said than done. Literature on 
Pakistan’s energy sector policies reveals a number of agreements with potential partners 
and at-length talks, but no significant output. There have been a lot of deliberations, 
sometimes trailed by memoranda of understanding (MoU). However, the outcome of 
deals has always remained short of what dialogue or MoU promises. Pakistan desperately 
needs to develop an energy vision which has absolutely sellable prospects for all of the 
regional and international stakeholders.  
Pakistan’s foreign policy initiatives need to be redeveloped to foster better 
relations with its regional and international community and its own long-term national 
interests. The United States will remain a significant player in this regard. Ebinger writes: 
“This is going to be difficult, given domestic anti-American sentiment coupled with 
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Pakistan’s interests in furthering relations with Iran. Still, Pakistan should not forget that 
the United States can, should it choose, give it a lot of support, both as a partner and a 
lobbying force within the international community.”23 Therefore, Pakistan needs to create  
conducive environment domestically as well as internationally in order to reap the 
benefits of energy security. 
D. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS 
This thesis hypothesizes that policy and institutional-level reforms are critical to 
addressing the energy crisis. Instead of being over-ambitious, these policies need to be 
binding, implementable, and futuristic. Institutions must be held accountable. There is a 
dire need to streamline the management, capacity building, and eliminating the issues of 
institutional overlap. Presently, “six ministries and forty-two agencies are involved in 
Pakistan’s energy policy making and provision. Successive administrations have added 
task forces, created special adviser posts, and one-off commissions.”24 This thesis also 
hypothesizes that Pakistan’s economy is the worst affected by the acute energy shortfall. 
Further, it hypothesizes that internal security challenges and financial constraints 
are the major impediments to energy development. Most of Pakistan’s domestic energy 
deposits are located in challenging zones, whether in terms of financial investment, 
infrastructure availability, or the security situation. Coal reserves are in the Thar Desert, 
which lacks infrastructure, and known oil and gas reserves are in Baluchistan and Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), where the security situation is adverse. Similarly, the volatile 
situation in Afghanistan is impeding the development of transnational projects. 
Therefore, internal and regional stability will be instrumental in tapping both domestic 
and regional energy resources.  
Finally, this thesis hypothesizes that regional energy projects are vital for 
Pakistan. The country’s geostrategic location offers it a unique opportunity to act as a 
linchpin between the energy-rich states of Central Asia and the Persian Gulf, as well as 
                                                 
23 Charles K. Ebinger, Energy and Security in South Asia: Co-operation or Conflict (Washington, DC: 
Brookings Institution Press, 2011), 81. 
24 Mills, “Pakistan’s Energy Crisis,” 6. 
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the emerging economies of southern and eastern Asia. Why not the rest of the world as 
well? With implementation of these transnational pipeline projects, Pakistan will not only 
substantively satisfy its own energy needs, but also serve as an energy corridor. These 
prospects are absolutely sellable to energy-producing and participating countries, but the 
daunting task of aligning the key regional players lies ahead. To achieve optimum results, 
effective foreign policy has a greater role to play. On one hand, regional energy 
partnerships may yield broader regional cooperation, peace, and stability, and on the 
other, they may put the region in turmoil due to competing interests of countries such as 
the United States, Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and India. 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
Ultimately, this research project aims to reach conclusions, based on the opinions 
of energy experts, that not only satisfy Pakistan’s energy needs but also make it an energy 
hub and corridor by tapping its regional resources. This thesis attempts to achieve this in 
the following ways: taking stock of available domestic energy resources and shortfalls, 
examining why policies have not worked and alternative energy means have not been 
explored, and developing a framework for achieving self-sufficiency in the energy sector.  
While discussing Pakistan’s domestic energy resources, this thesis begins with an 
overview of the available energy mix in Pakistan and also highlight the pattern of supply 
and demand over a period of time. It also looks into the economic implications of the 
present excessive shortfall, along with future challenges. In arguing why policies did not 
work, this thesis explores whether policies were practical, if institutions had the capacity 
to implement them, whether required infrastructure and financial backing was available, 
or if during different regimes they remained only a political slogan. The thesis also 
focuses on the variety of energy resources projects—both domestic and regional—that 
mostly remained short of realization.  
Thereafter, together with the regional relations and security paradigm, this thesis 
explores the prospects of regional oil and gas pipeline projects, how they can be 
implemented, and what prospects they will have for the region’s security and prosperity. 
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This thesis discusses how Pakistan can assume a leading role in the process and 
formulates a set of conclusions to overcome the energy crisis. 
An analysis of the statistical aspects of Pakistan’s energy resources is not used; 
however, quantitative data regarding various sources of energy are presented to lay the 
building blocks of study and to examine the gravity of the energy crisis, such as the gap 
between supply and demand. Due to the country-specific and limited nature of the 
subject, few published books are accessible. Most of the research used for this report 
comes from official government documents, seminars, presentations, and scholarly and 
peer-reviewed journals and articles. However, a number of additional publications are 
presented to evaluate the effects of multi-lateral regional and global relations in pursuit of 
a regional energy system and energy trade. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis consists of five chapters. Chapter I lays the foundation of research 
work, and Chapter II presents an overview of Pakistan’s existing energy resources, 
current energy mix, and the potential of renewable energy technologies. Chapter III 
discusses a range of energy sector challenges—institutional, governmental, political, and 
financial—that are detrimental to achieving energy security. Chapter IV explores 
Pakistan’s options for exploiting the opportunities of transnational gas pipeline projects 
and the import of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) to diversify its energy mix and achieve 
energy security. This chapter also highlights the possibility of improving Pakistan’s 
national and regional security situation due to perceived mutual economic 
interdependence, while satisfying their respective growing energy needs. Finally, Chapter 
V concludes the thesis, based on the opinions of experts in the energy sector. 
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II. PAKISTAN’S CURRENT ENERGY SCENARIO AND 
POTENTIAL 
In the past decade, Pakistan’s energy demand has increased by approximately 45 
percent. On the contrary, energy production has followed a flatter trajectory, thereby 
increasing the demand and supply gap enormously. If this phenomenon continues for the 
next couple of decades, the energy sector will be unsustainable. The state of Pakistan’s 
current energy resources and domestic potentials is discussed in this chapter.  
Pakistan’s current energy scenario reflects the following:  
During 2013–14 Pakistan’s total energy availability was 66.015 million 
tons of oil equivalent (mtoe), of which 45.251 mtoe (i.e. 68.54%) was 
indigenous production while 20.764 mtoe (31.46%) was imported. The 
domestic energy sources comprised natural gas, hydel power, about one 
third of our crude oil supply, and small quantities of coal and nuclear 
energy. Imported energy mainly comprised petroleum and petroleum 
products.25 
Pakistan’s current energy mix is not diversified; furthermore, heavy reliance on 
imported fuel leaves no flexibility in addressing the energy shortages. Pakistan’s current 
energy mix consists of the following sources:  
• Natural gas 49.5%  
• Oil 30.8% 
• Hydel energy 12.5% 
• Coal 6.5% 
• Nuclear, LPG, & imported electricity 0.7%26 
A. OIL 
Domestically, an average 12–13 million tons of oil is refined in the country per 
year. The largest oil refinery is the “Pak-Arab Refinery Complex (PARCO), which 
                                                 
25 Pakistan Energy Yearbook. “Oil Refineries in Pakistan.” Ministry of Petroleum and Natural 
Resources. Government of Pakistan, 2012, 92. 
26 Ibid. 
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became operational in late 2000, with 95,000 bbl/d of refining capacity. The majority of 
produced oil comes from proven reserves located in the southern half of the country, with 
the three largest oil-producing fields located in the Southern Indus Basin.”27 In 2006, 
domestic crude oil production fell to an average of 58,000 bbl/d. Hence, due to its meager 
domestic oil production, the country is heavily reliant on imported oil to catch up with its 
energy demand. Currently, Pakistan imports approximately one-third of its primary 
energy needs, principally through the external purchase of over 400,000 barrels of 
petroleum products per day, at a cost of approximately $15 billion per year. Nearly 90 
percent of the imports are used to fuel the power sector, which previously ran on natural 
gas. In 2011, the Pakistan Institute of Petroleum forecast that energy imports would grow 
to $50 billion or more by 2025.28 For the bulk of its oil imports, Pakistan is dependent 
upon the Middle East (ME), with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) in the lead role. 
The latest data available on oil reserves shows a production of approximately 633 million 
barrels and remaining proven recoverable oil reserves of 314 million barrels. Pakistan 
currently produces around 10.34 million tons of oil from local refineries per year.29 
B. NATURAL GAS 
Historically, oil and gas have been a major source of energy since the time of 
British rule in the subcontinent. Well exploration in this region (now Pakistan) dates back 
to 1887, when the first well was drilled in Punjab Province, Mianwali District. 
Subsequently, a series of well drilling continued in Baluchistan. Later, exploration spread 
to other regions of the country. In 1952, 10 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of estimated gas 
reserves were discovered at Sui in Baluchistan Province, which still contributes a major 
share to the energy sector. After the Sui gas field discovery, agreements were signed with 
numerous international companies: Standard Vacuum Oil (1954), Hunt International Oil 
(1955), Shell Oil (1956), Sun Oil (1957), and Tidewater (1958).30 However, these 
                                                 
27 Pakistan Energy Yearbook. “Oil Refineries in Pakistan.” Ministry of Petroleum and Natural 
Resources. Government of Pakistan, 2012, 39. 
28 Ibid., 25. 
29 Ibid., 27. 
30 Ieda Gomes, “Natural Gas in Pakistan and Bangladesh: Current Issues and Trends,” Oxford Institute 
for Energy Studies, June 2013: 11.  
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franchise agreements did not yield the desired results and Pakistan’s government decided 
to explore the hydrocarbon resources through two state-owned companies: Oil and Gas 
Development Corporation (OGDC) and Pakistan Petroleum Limited (PPL). Presently, 
government-owned shares account for 71 percent, private investment for 22 percent, and 
Employees Empowerment Trust of PPL for 7 percent of the shares.31 
In Pakistan, the energy matrix is dominated by natural gas; it accounts for almost 
50 percent of overall energy supplies. Besides fueling millions of vehicles, natural gas is 
the prime source of energy for commercial and residential sectors. Pakistan ranks twenty-
first in the world as a major gas consumer. Its use of gas as a source of energy is 
comparable to France’s use. Until 2005, Pakistan’s gas production was sufficient to meet 
its needs.32 Unfortunately, lack of alternatives in the energy sector, the issue of subsidies, 
and the absence of realistic forecasting, coupled with institutional and policy constraints, 
resulted in a widening gap between supply and demand. Gas production in Pakistan is 
mainly limited to onshore drilling; offshore discoveries remain short of expectations due 
to unattractive fiscal terms and maritime rivalry in the neighborhood. According to 
Pakistan’s Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources (MPNR), “the remaining 
reserves of natural gas are 27.5 Tcf (gas) and 342 million barrels (oil).”33 The 
organizational structure of MPNR is given in Figure 2.34 
                                                 
31 Pakistan Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority (OGRA), Islamabad, Annual Report, 2013. 
32 Ibid.  
33 Gomes, “Natural Gas in Pakistan and Bangladesh,” 8.   
34 Ibid., 14. The upstream activities in the oil and gas sector are administered and regulated through 
the Directorate General of Petroleum concessions (DGPC) under the policy wing of the Ministry of 
Petroleum and Natural Resources (MPNR). The policy wing also comprises the Directorate General of Gas 
(DG Gas), Directorate General of Oil (DG Oil), and Directorate General Special Projects (DGSP) to 
provide support to the government in formulation of policies for midstream and downstream of the oil and 
gas sector. 
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Figure 2.  Organizational Structure 
 
Source: Wikipedia, “Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources Pakistan,” accessed 
November 16, 2015. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ministry_of_Petroleum_ 
and_Natural_Resources_%28Pakistan%29. 
Over the last few years, demand for natural gas is sliding up by six percent as 
compared to production, which is flat or even moving downwards. The supply-demand 
gulf is constantly enlarging. As per the data collected by the Pakistan Institute of 
Petroleum (PIP), “the energy deficit in Pakistan will reach nearly 15 Million Tons of Oil 
Equivalent (MTOE) by 2020 even taking into account the projected imports of natural 
gas.”35 See Figure 3. 
                                                 
35 Pakistan Institute of Petroleum (PIP), Islamabad, Annual Report, 2013. 
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Figure 3.  Domestic Energy Supply 
 
Source: Gomes, “Natural Gas in Pakistan and Bangladesh,” 10. 
 
According to the latest official estimates, the real-time availability and 
consumption of natural gas in Pakistan measures approximately 40 billion cubic meters 
per annum (Bcma).36 If an unmet quantity of 15 Bcma is added to this measurement—
which includes fuel oil utilized for running power plants and industrial use, along with 3–
4 Bcma unutilized capacity—then the resulting shortfall is around 15–19 Bcma.37 Based 
on projected GDP growth of 6.5 percent, PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) concluded that 
demand will rise to 65–70 Bcma by the year 2020, resulting in a supply-demand gap of 
40–50 Bcma, which will be equivalent to current consumption.38 It is evident that in the 
near future, a huge shortfall in gas supplies will be unavoidable. In an effort to mitigate 
this looming threat, the materialization of transnational gas pipeline projects, including 
importation of LNG, is indispensable. Even if these projects find manifestation, 
                                                 
36 Billion cubic meters of natural gas (Bcm) is a measure of natural gas production and trade. 
Depending on implied standards, this measure may represent different values of energy content. According 
to the standard defined by the International Energy Agency, it corresponds in average to 38.2 pet joules 
(1.06×1010 kWh) of energy in the case of Russian natural gas and 41.4 pet joules (1.15×1010 kWh) of 
energy in the case of Qatar’s natural gas.  
37 ISGC website: Conservative Scenario (PIP-Pakistan Institute of Petroleum), Optimistic Scenario: 
PwC analysis (Pakistan Interstate Gas Systems: http://www.isgs.pk/energy_sector .php?spid=22&mid=2) 
38 ISGC website: Optimistic Scenario: PwC analysis  
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diversifying Pakistan’s energy mix will still be necessary to achieve energy security (see 
Figure 4). 
Figure 4.  Natural Gas Supply Demand 
 
Source: Gomes, “Natural Gas in Pakistan and Bangladesh,” 14. 
C. COAL 
Despite many advances in the field of energy, coal still retains the biggest chunk 
of all energy resources in the world—almost 39 percent of total power generation in the 
world. Coal has added advantages. It is available in abundance, comparatively cheap, and 
safe in storage and transportation. In terms of their reliance on coal as a source of energy 
production, the leading countries are as follows: Poland produces over 95 percent of 
electricity with coal, South Africa produces about 92 percent, China produces 77 percent, 
and Australia produces 76 percent. Coal’s use as a source of energy is increasing much 
more than any other form of energy—hydro, oil, gas, renewable, or nuclear—despite 
environmental concerns. Ejaz Ahmed Khan says: “Reliance on coal is increasing day by 
day specifically in developing countries.”39 He further writes: “According to World 
                                                 
39 Khalid Mansoor, “How Coal Can Help Address Pakistan’s Energy Crisis,” in Pakistan’s 
Interminable Energy Crisis: Is There Any Way Out?, ed. Michael Kugelman (Washington, DC: Woodrow 
Wilson Center Press, 2015), 41. Ejaz Ahmed Khan is a former secretary in the Coal and Energy 
Department.  
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Energy Outlook (WEO), future energy demand in emerging Asian countries will increase 
to 60% by 2020 as compared to 26% in 1980.”40 
Figure 5.  Total World Electricity Generation 
 
Source: Anwar, Solutions for Energy Crisis in Pakistan, 2013. 
Currently in Pakistan, “coal plays a negligible role in its energy mix, although the 
country contains an estimated 3,362 million short tons (Mmst) of proven recoverable 
reserves.”41 Despite these huge, proven reserves, Pakistan utilizes only approximately 3.5 
Mmst per year for energy production, which is a negligible amount in the country’s 
current energy mix. 
In 1992, the Geological Survey of Pakistan (GSP) and the United States 
Geological Survey (USGS) discovered massive coal deposits in Tharparkar (Thar) in 
Sind Province. This research program included drilling over two hundred holes, spread 
over an area of approximately 350 square kilometers: 
                                                 
40 Ibid. 
41 Langdon D. Clough, “Energy Profile of Pakistan,” in Encyclopedia of Earth, ed. Cutler J. 
Cleveland, 6, http://www.eoearth.org/article/Energy_profile_of_Pakistan.  
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Thar coalfield is spread over an area of more then, 9,000 sq. km. and 
passes 175.506 billion tons of coal. It is one of the largest coalfields of the 
World and is sufficient to meet fuel requirements of over a hundred years, 
if the basic infrastructure is established. The province of Sindh is endowed 
with huge coal deposits, estimated at 184.123 billion tons. Out of which, 
Thar coal deposit comprises 175. 506 billion tons, which constitutes 
around 99% of total coal deposits of the country. The coal deposits of 
Sindh (coal field-wise) are as quoted under: 
Coal-field     (Billion Tones) 
Lakhra, District Dadu     1.328 
Sonda-Jherruck, District Thatta   7.112 
Jhimpir-Metting, District Thatta   0.161 
Badin        0.016 
Thar        175.506 
Total        184.12342 
Pakistan has a great opportunity to benefit from these recently discovered coal 
resources. Munir writes: “A breakdown of the estimated value of energy resources in 
Pakistan in terms of U.S. $ in billion highlights that oil has an estimated value of 6 billion 
dollars, gas has 25 billion dollars, whereas, coal has an estimated value of 5,540 billion 
dollars.”43 With the discovery of the Thar coalfield reserves, Pakistan now ranks seventh 
among the top twenty countries possessing lignite coal reserves. Since the discovery, a 
number of countries have offered Pakistan potential partnerships in the exploration and 
development of the Thar coal project. Main contenders include the United States, 
Germany, China, the United Kingdom, and Australia. Such partnerships can only 
materialize if an enabling environment is created by constructing an institutional and 
physical infrastructure, and by initiating investor-friendly long-term policies. 
                                                 
42 Faiz Muhammad Shaikh, Muneer Ali Shah, and Anwar Ali Shah, “Energy Crisis in Pakistan: Thar 
Coal as an Alternative Solution,” New Horizons 11, no. 1 (January 2012): 3.        
43 Dr. Munir Ali Shah is Dean of Faculty of Management Sciences and Information Studies, 
Greenwich University, Karachi, Pakistan. 
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D. HYDROELECTRICITY 
Pakistan is blessed with a huge potential for hydroelectric power, which has the 
capacity to generate approximately 60,000 megawatts of energy against the current peak 
time requirement of only 21,000 megawatts.44 Besides being environmental friendly, 
hydel-generated power is one of the cheapest sources of energy once it is put in place. 
Currently, only 11 percent of Pakistan’s hydropower potential is being utilized, and the 
remaining 89 percent is untapped due to a number of factors that are discussed in Chapter 
II. The overall installed capacity, based on hydel projects, is just 6,720 megawatts. Major 
power-contributing plants are located at Terbela, Mangla, Warsak Dams, Guddu Barrage, 
and Chashma Canal. A regional-based summary of these projects is tabulated in Figure 6. 
Figure 6.  Total Installed Capacity 
 
Source: Pakistan Private Infrastructure Board, Hydropower Resources of Pakistan 
(Ministry of Water and Power, Government of Pakistan, 2011), 7. 
These hydropower projects are managed by different entities of the public sector, 
namely, Sarhad Hydel Development Organization (SHYDO), WAPDA, Water and Power 
Department of Gilgit-Baltistan, and Hydro Electric Board (HEB) in Azad Jammu and 
                                                 
44 Umar K. Mirza et al., “Hydropower Use in Pakistan: Past, Present, and Future,” Renewable and 
Sustainable Energy Reviews 12, no. 6 (2008): 107.        
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Kashmir (AJ&K). Existing installed projects, based on their managing sector, location, 
and generation capacity, are tabulated in Tables 1–4.  
Table 1.   Existing Hydropower Projects in Operation in Pakistan 
 
Source: Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA), www.wapda.gov.pk. 
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Table 2.   Sarhad Hydel Development Organization (SHYDO) 
 
Source: Sarhad Hydel Development Organization (SHYDO). www.shydo.gov.pk. 
Table 3.   AJ&K Hydro Electric Board (HEB) 
 
Source: AJ&K Hydro Electric Board (HEB), Government of AJ&K. 
www.electricity.ajk.gov.pk. 
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Table 4.   Water and Power Department—Gilgit-Baltistan 
 
Source: Water and Power Department, Gilgit-Baltistan. Gilgit-Baltistan Secretariat, WSP 
Headquarters, Gilgit, www.gilgitbaltistan.gov.pk. 
Of the total installed capacity of 6,720 megawatts, power produced by each 
province is explained in Figure 7.  
Figure 7.  Province Wise Installed Hydropower Generation Capacity 
 
Source: Pakistan Private Infrastructure Board, Hydropower Resources of Pakistan 
(Ministry of Water and Power, Government of Pakistan, 2011), 12. 
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If institutional, political, and financial hurdles are overshadowed and even 25 
percent of the current untapped potential is harnessed within the next two decades, the 
gap between supply and demand can be reduced to a manageable limit. However, this 
does not negate the necessity of building other energy sources—of increasing Pakistan’s 
capacity to generate energy as well as diversifying its energy mix. Table 5 summarizes 
the existing public and private projects, along with solicited and raw sites. 
Table 5.   Summary of Hydropower Resources in Pakistan 
 
Source: Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA), www.wapda.gov.pk. 
Although developing additional hydroelectric sources has always been on the 
table, financial and political constraints have always overshadowed the necessity and 
significance of these power-generation plans. The Private Power and Infrastructure Board 
(PPIB) is working on the feasibility study of numerous small-scale hydropower projects. 
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If these projects materialize, a considerable amount of electricity will be added to the 
grid.  
E. OTHER RENEWABLE ENERGY (RE) SOURCES 
IEA statistics indicate that worldwide, renewable energy is growing at a fast pace. 
In 2011, about 21 percent of the world’s electricity generation was from renewable 
energy (including hydropower), with a projection for it to grow to nearly 25–30 percent 
in 2040.45 However, efforts in Pakistan to substitute fossil fuels with renewable energy 
sources (excluding large hydro) in order to diversify the current energy mix, or even to 
reduce the huge gap between supply and demand, have not succeeded for many reasons.  
The 2002 Power Policy of Pakistan emphasizes the need and future prospects of 
building RE resources, but the strategy and framework for its execution are missing. 
Unfortunately, “the resource planning and acquisition processes have ignored the value of 
renewable energy resources.”46 Environmental and long-term economic benefits of RE 
technologies have largely been disregarded in the process of energy forecasting. 
In May 2003, the Alternative Energy Development Board (AEDB) was 
established. In the field of RE, it is the only agency that represents the federal 
government. According to the mandate of AEDB, its primary objective is “to facilitate, 
promote and encourage development of Renewable Energy in Pakistan,” with a “mission 
to introduce Alternative and Renewable Energies (AREs) at an accelerated rate.”47 In 
2006, the Ministry of Water and Power took over the administrative control of AEDB. 
The AEDB is responsible for: 
• Implement policies, programs, and projects through private sector in the field 
of alternative and renewable energy 
• Assist and facilitate the development and generation of ARE to achieve 
sustainable economic growth 
                                                 
45 Africa Energy Outlook - World Energy Outlook Special Report, 21. 
https://www.iea.org/publications/.../WEO2014_AfricaEnergyOutlook.pdf  
46 United Nations Development Program, “Commercialization of Wind Power Potential in Pakistan” 
(Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: United Nations Office for Project Services, 2003). 
47 M. Ashraf Chaudhry, R. Raza, and SA Hayat, “Renewable Energy Technologies in Pakistan: 
Prospects and Challenges,” Renewable and Sustainable Energy Review 13, no. 6 (2009): 1659. 
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• Encourage the transfer of technology and develop an indigenous 
manufacturing base for ARE Technology 
• Promote the provision of energy services that are based on ARE resources 
• Undertake ARE projects on a commercial scale (AEDB Act 2010)48 
AEDB has been given the mandate by the government of Pakistan (GoP) to 
develop a renewable energy resource with a capacity to contribute at least 10 percent 
toward the total generation capacity of the country by 2030.49 To begin with, wind, solar, 
and biogas are the selected technologies. Pakistan has a huge potential for harnessing 
these environmentally friendly energy resources, but unfortunately, until recently, no 
wind farms at a commercial level are functional and only a few micro-wind turbines are 
in use as a pilot project. Similarly, few rooftop Photovoltaic (PV) or commercial and 
household thermal systems are in place. 
Like other forms of alternative energy, use of biomass as source of energy 
production has remain shorot of implementation. Currently, “sugar mills in the country 
use bagasse for cogeneration purposes and have recently been allowed to sell surplus 
power to the grid stations.”50 Commercially, no other significant “biomass-based 
technology is presently employed for energy production/use in the country, beyond 
experimental deployment of biogas digesters, improved cook stoves, and other small 
scale end-use applications.”51 Biogas digesters, when used in countryside households, 
were considered a great success. However, due to a lack of futuristic planning and 
policies and the withdrawal of external subsidies, any perceived potential could not be 
achieved. 
                                                 
48 Ministry of Water and Power, “Policy for Development of Renewable Energy for Power 
Generation,” (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 2006).   
49Vaqar Ahmed, “Economics of Energy Mix: The Case of Pakistan,” in Solutions for Energy Crisis in 
Pakistan, ed. Mushir Anwar (Islamabad, Pakistan: Islamabad Policy Research Institute, 2013), 40. 
50 Bagasse is a byproduct of sugar cane and is a common fuel in the sugar industry. In addition, 
bagasse is also used as a fuel in the treacle-making process in Pakistan. The production of bagasse is 340 
kilograms per 1,000 kilograms of cane, crushed at an average moisture content of 50 percent. 
51 Pakistan Society of Sugar Mills Association (PSSMA), Annual Report 2013, and Summary of 
Laboratories Reports.  
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Amjad Ali Awan, chief executive of the AEDB, recently claimed that with the 
cooperation of USAID, the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) has 
developed solar and wind resource maps for macro-level planning and execution as 
shown in Figures 8 and 9.52 Similarly, the World Bank is also financing mapping 
initiatives in the field of RE, and spatial planning and mapping has been initiated to tap 
the biomass, solar, and wind energy resources.53 In a nutshell, to harness the potential of 
RE, key issues must be addressed, including a dedicated effort to overcome the 
institutional, political, financial, and policy constraints already discussed. 
Figure 8.  Pakistan Flat Plate Tilted at Latitude Fall 
 
Source:Pakistan Resource Maps and Toolkit, National Renewable Energy Laboratory,  
http://www.nrel.gov/international/ra_pakistan.html. 
                                                 
52 The National Renewable Energy Laboratory, located in Golden, Colorado, is the United States’ 
primary laboratory for renewable energy and energy efficiency research and development. 
53Alternative Energy Development Boards’ policies for Renewable Energy in Pakistan, June 10, 2015.   
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Figure 9.  Pakistan 50 m Wind Power 
 
Source Pakistan Resource Maps and Toolkit, National Renewable Energy Laboratory,   
http://www.nrel.gov/international/ra_pakistan.html.  
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III. ENERGY SECTOR CHALLENGES: INSTITUTIONAL, 
GOVERNMENTAL, AND POLITICAL OBSTACLES 
As of late 2014 and early 2015, situations demonstrate that the energy crisis in 
Pakistan is deeply entrenched, with devastating consequences and manifestations. 
Besides Pakistan’s growing demand for energy, inefficient institutional and 
organizational structures are major factors contributing to this mess. Therefore, it is 
important to realize that simply building additional energy infrastructure and enhancing 
the volume of energy generated will not help Pakistan alleviate the simmering issue of its 
energy crisis. Keeping in mind the total current generation capacity versus peak time 
demand, which are almost the same, it is safe to assume that shortcomings of 
management (including governmental, institutional, and political hurdles) are the key 
impediments to stabilizing the situation. The current shortfall between supply and 
demand of about 5,000 megawatts is primarily attributed to the management 
inefficiencies that are being discussed here.54 In February 2014, the ADB report stated 
that “the [energy] problem has been exacerbated by existing generating capacity not 
being fully employed. In May 2013, out of eleven public sector thermal power plants, 
seven were completely shut down and the rest were not running at full capacity due to 
fuel shortages.”55 
The energy sector in Pakistan lacks cohesiveness and unified authority at the 
planning and decision level, which is necessary for long-term, futuristic, and sustainable 
                                                 
54 Malik Musadiq, “Pakistan’s Energy Crisis: Challenges, Principles, and Strategies,” in Pakistan’s 
Interminable Energy Crisis: Is There Any Way Out?, ed. Kugelman Michael (Washington, DC: Woodrow 
Wilson Center Press, 2015), 27. 
55 Asian Development Bank, Pakistan: Energy Sector Restructuring Program, February 2014. 
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policies.56 The Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority (OGRA) is responsible for the 
regulation of oil and gas; whereas, according to section 7(3)(a) of the act, the “National 
Electric and Power Regulatory Authority (NEPRA) is exclusively responsible for 
determining tariff, rates, charges and other terms and conditions for supply of electric 
power services by the generation, transmission and distribution companies and 
recommend to the Federal Government for notification.”57 Similarly, hydel power 
projects are managed by the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA). The 
institutional fragmentation of various components of energy sources like fuel, electricity, 
and water is prominent. ADB’s Pakistan director, Rune Stroem, who is also co-chair of 
the Energy Sector Task Force, notes that:  
Responsibilities and accountabilities in Pakistan’s energy sector are 
dispersed to the point that they are ineffective. … This fragmentation 
blocks integrated planning and budgeting in the energy sector, distorts 
efficiency, creates disequilibrium among the subsectors, and generates 
disharmonious regulatory structures. Energy security simply cannot be 
achieved unless it is treated as an integrated item.58  
This lack of executive-level singular planning and one decision-making body has 
always resulted in ad-hoc measures and piecemeal policies. These policies were neither 
effective nor adequate to achieve energy security. Mirza Hamid Hassan, a former 
secretary of the Ministry of Water and Power, says: “Important issues such as the close 
linkage between various forms of energy, the affordability and sustainability of energy 
supplies, the linkage between choice of technologies and resultant cost of energy etc., 
never received the attention of our policy makers and planners in the absence of a 
                                                 
56 The U.S. government conducted a three-part study of Pakistan’s policy-making infrastructure in 
mid-2008. Dawn reported the cables in full in July 2011, which revealed the U.S. view that the country’s 
power problems were the result of “the haphazard mix of horizontally and vertically placed institutions, 
which comprise the energy policy making sector of Pakistan.” Further to this, the cables referred to “the 
complex maze of GOP [government of Pakistan] policy makers who cannot co-ordinate Pakistan’s energy 
policy due to overlapping and contradictory authorities.” A lack of a distinct policy line, and confusion 
over decision making, means that basic issues like raising well-head prices (the price the producer charges 
for gas or petroleum) to encourage exploration and extraction are not pursued or are pursued painstakingly 
slowly. www.dawn.com/.../secret-us-cables-accessed-by-dawn-through-wikileaks-us- examined-haphazard-
mix-of-pakistans-energy-bureaucracy   
57 Remarks by Chief Justice Supreme Court of Pakistan, during hearing on Rental Power Projects 
scam. 
58 Energy Task Force, Integrated Energy Sector Recovery Report & Plan, (Pakistan, Islamabad: 
Energy Task Force, October 2010), vi. 
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comprehensive policy.”59 Therefore, it can be safely concluded that the current energy 
crisis is largely the product of policy makers and planners failing to forecast and 
construct viable long-term energy policies, and instead introducing piecemeal and short-
term measures. Some of the policies floated from time to time are quoted as follows: 
• Policy Framework and Package of Incentives for Private Sector Power 
Generation Projects in Pakistan 1994 (popularly known as 1994 Power 
Policy)—formulated to meet the growing power shortage through private 
sector investment 
• Policy for Power Generation Projects 2002—formulated to improve upon 
the 1994 policy and to encourage private sector to invest in hydropower 
projects 
• Policy Framework for New Captive Power Producers—formulated by 
PEPCO 
• Policy for Development of Renewable Energy for Power Generation 2006 
• Draft Renewable Energy Policy of Pakistan 2012 
• Punjab Power Generation Policy 2006 (revised in 2009) 
• Petroleum policies floated from time to time, including Petroleum 
Exploration and Development Policy 2012.60 
Historically, “Pakistan’s power sector was organized into two state-owned, 
vertically integrated utilities,” which are explained in Appendix A. The institutional 
organization of Pakistan’s power structure is discussed in Appendix B.61 
The management and governance of Pakistan’s energy sector are other big issues, 
and in power economy this is not a framework that can sustain itself. According to 
different sources, the average losses in transmission and distribution (T&D) amount to 
20–25 percent. Out of this, the biggest loss is attributed to distribution. This issue is not 
Pakistan-specific; India surpasses Pakistan with average T&D losses of 31–32 percent. 
However, contrary to Pakistan, Indian authorities are seriously concerned about the 
energy issue and are taking concrete measures to minimize T&D losses. For example, in 
                                                 
59 Mirza, “An Overview of Pakistan’s Energy Sector,” 10. 
60 Ibid., 13. 
61 Vucetic and Adamantiades, “Power Sector Reforms in Pakistan,” 106–107. 
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New Delhi, they have achieved remarkable success by stripping down T&D losses to 
around 21–22 percent.62 Even the most developed countries of the world face T&D 
losses, but their percentage is much less than third world countries. In addition to T&D 
losses, revenue recovery is another pitfall. Recovery of revenue from consumers in both 
private and public sectors is almost half of the billing totals for power producers. Old and 
obsolete meters and billing systems also contribute to inefficiencies by making it very 
easy for anybody to tamper with the meters. In fact, meter readers themselves interfere 
with the billing system. Clearly, the current system lacks accountability and transparency. 
The resulting outcome is the accumulation of circular debt.63 This circular debt affects 
not only the power sector itself; rather, a liquidity crunch sparks a chain reaction, 
resulting in the interruption of the oil and gas sectors’ supply chain and the weakening of 
financial organizations.  
The lack of desired and possible energy mix is also largely attributed to the 
energy sector’s institutional inefficiencies. Dr. Vaqar Ahmed notes, 
Globally, the average usage for oil of energy generation stands at five 
percent compared with Pakistan where the same number stands at a 
whopping 32 percent (2011). While the world uses on average 21 percent 
gas for energy generation, Pakistan continues to drain its gas reserves as 
the same number is at 48 percent. As the world searched for cheaper and 
more reliable sources of energy the reliance increased towards coal 
(contrary to what environmental experts would have suggested). Today, 
due to its low price global average usage of coal in energy generation 
stands at 40 percent and the same number for Pakistan is seven percent.64 
                                                 
62 The lowest T&D rates are in Japan (4 percent). Denmark, Germany, Singapore, France, Australia, 
Canada, China, South Africa, Switzerland, and Sweden are at 6 percent. The United States, United 
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63 Circular debt reflects the difference between high power generation cost and low electricity bills. 
The circular debt accumulates as the government’s subsidy bill balloons. Last year, the government settled 
a 480 billion-rupee (Dh17.5bn) circular debt after clearing dues to the Independent Power Producers (IPPs) 
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64Vaqar , “Economics of Energy Mix,” 39. 
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This analysis and Pakistan’s current energy supply mix, as shown in Figure 10, 
demonstrate two factors: (1) total failure or absence of evidence-based planning and (2) 
desperately needed energy sector reforms. 
Figure 10.  Energy Supply Mix 2012–2013 
 
 
Source: Pakistan Energy Yearbook, “Oil Refineries in Pakistan,” Ministry of Petroleum 
and Natural Resources, Government of Pakistan, 2012, 6. 
The worsening energy crisis is further compounded by a lack of consensus 
between the provinces and the central government due to the politicization of power 
projects on ethno-linguistic bases and resource and revenue-sharing issues. There has 
always been resistance to policy making and implementation, either by the provincial or 
central government. Unfortunately, energy policy issues are highly politicized in 
Pakistan. Prior to the 2013 general elections, Punjab’s provincial government 
(opposition-run) had a series of sit-ins demanding a solution to the energy crisis and 
criticizing the central government for its energy policies. However, since the same 
political party, Pakistan Muslim League N (PMLN), came into power after the general 
elections of 2013, there has been no significant improvement in the energy situation and 
tall claims of overcoming the energy crisis remain unproved.   
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The other three provinces have their own reasons to disown the central 
government’s plans and policies. Pakistan is blessed with a lot of hydropower potential, 
but due to the provincial opposition (Sindh and KPK), this huge potential remains 
untapped. A case in point is the issue of construction of the Kalabagh Dam on the Indus 
River, with a power generation capacity of approximately 3,500–4000 megawatts. 
According to the Journal of Hydrology, “Pakistan has used only about 10 percent of its 
estimated 40,000 mw of economically viable hydropower potential, a proportion around 
30 percent lower than India and China and around 75 percent lower than other developed 
states.”65 Both provinces oppose construction of this hydroelectric project on the basis of 
possible negative effects, such as population displacement, silting up and backwater 
issues, the flooding of populated areas, etc. The problem is aggravated when ethno-
linguistic and political spheres merge together. The International Panel of Experts (IPOE) 
and other feasibility studies consider these provincial apprehensions for constructing the 
Kalabagh Dam as baseless.66 The devastating flood of 2010 revealed the significance of 
and need for building this dam; however, resentment and lack of trust and political will 
limits the state’s ability to do so. In the case of Baluchistan Province, the case is not 
much different. Issues of energy resource and revenue distribution between the central 
and provincial governments are most acute.  
Private sector participation plays an important role in national development 
projects. By the end of 2005, approximately 6,000 MW of electricity was being generated 
in Pakistan by independent power producers (IPPs). In 2006, this was followed by the 
induction of Rental Power Projects (RPPs), which ran into controversy and were declared 
illegal by the apex court. The main reasons cited were lack of transparency in awarding 
contracts, heavy upfront payments, and advance mobilizations. Thereafter, no worthwhile 
progress has been made in private sector participation. 
                                                 
65 Muhammad Akhtar, Nasir Ahmed, and M. J. Booij, “The Impact of Climate Change on the Water 
Resources of Hindukush-Karakoram-Himalaya Region under Different Glacier Coverage Scenarios,” 
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66 Muhammad Israr Khan et al., “Feasibility Study of Kalabagh Dam Pakistan,” Life Science Journal 
11, no. 9 (2014): 459.  
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A current spate of domestic unrest, together with provincial, localized grievances 
and regional security environments, have created a security dilemma, which is also a key 
obstruction to achieving energy security. Problems related to achieving energy security 
are twofold: (1) the current spate of domestic terrorism and (2) localized grievances, 
including sub-nationalist separatists’ insurgencies. Pakistan is blessed in abundance with 
natural energy resources, but unfortunately their availability is mostly bounded by areas 
with a troubled past and present, or in areas with no infrastructure to support the 
extrication of energy resources. Major sources of energy like oil, gas, and coal deposits 
are found in provinces that have peculiar problems. For example, Khyber Pakhtunkhaw 
(KPK) has huge deposits of oil, but the situation with Federally Administered Tribal 
Areas (FATA) along the Pak-Afghan border is well documented and needs no 
elaboration. The discovery of Thar coal deposits, the safest and one of the cheapest forms 
of energy, is yet to be explored due to lack of infrastructure and sustainable, long-term, 
investor-friendly policies. Pakistan will have to open up to the world instead of merely 
relying on China for its energy sector development.67 
Similarly, Baluchistan Province is blessed with huge gas reserves, but deep-rooted 
tribal issues, including tribal-separatist movements and the grievances of masses against 
the central government, disrupt the security equation. For example, Baluchistan Province 
is the major contributor of Pakistan’s gas supply, but its share of consumption in total 
national production is only almost 6 percent. The same is the case with royalty share, 
which goes to this province. This treatment of the province is a clear violation of “Article 
158 of the constitution of Pakistan: priority of requirements of natural gas.”68 This is not 
the end of the story. The situation is further complicated by the frequent disruption of gas 
supplies due to anti-state elements blowing up gas pipelines. Similarly, the kidnapping of 
foreigner engineers working in the energy sector, particularly in Gwadar, and gun 
                                                 
67 Sumita Kumar, “The China-Pakistan Strategic Relationship: Trade, Investment, Energy, and 
Infrastructure,” Strategic Analysis 31, no. 5 (2007): 775.  
68 Article 158: “The Province in which a well-head of natural gas is situated shall have precedence 
over other parts of Pakistan in meeting the requirements from the well-head, subject to the commitments 
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running and bomb blasts hinder progress in developing the energy sector. This unrest is 
also a major deterrent for foreign investors.69 
On the regional front, in an effort to benefit from the transnational oil and gas 
projects, the current regional security environment is a key impediment. Pak-Afghan, 
Pakistan-India, and U.S.-Iran relations, and the interests of other regional players like 
Russia, China, and Saudi Arabia are also key factors in harnessing these energy 
potentials; and for Pakistan, to assume the role of regional energy hub together with the 
development of Gwadar deep sea port in collaboration with China, still seems to be a 
daunting task.70 Recent investment of $46 billion by the Chinese government is an 
important development in this regard. 
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IV. TRANSNATIONAL PIPELINES/REGIONAL PROSPECTS: 
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 
Pakistan desperately needs to achieve energy security, and time and resources are 
fundamental requirements to overcoming the ever-increasing gap between supply and 
demand. Unfortunately, Pakistan does not have the time or resources. According to 2007 
EIA estimates, Pakistan’s indigenous gas reserves are 28,000 bcf, which could suffice for 
the next twenty years.71 However, due to an overreliance on gas and a lack of desired 
energy mix, energy experts fear that existing gas reserves may not last even that long and 
may diminish as early as 2020.72 An enormously increasing demand for energy calls for 
an intelligible national energy policy that encompasses managerial issues, fact-based 
planning, tapping hydro-potential, mainstreaming domestic energy resources, and most 
important, incorporating transnational gas pipeline projects. Elizabeth Mills writes: 
“Pakistan is situated at the confluence of Central Asia, West Asia, and South Asia; a sure 
gateway for mutual regional cooperation in energy sector.”73 Therefore, Pakistan’s 
neighboring energy-rich regional countries can not only assist Pakistan in mitigating its 
energy shortfalls, but can also profit from its geostrategic location. Available regional 
energy options include Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI), Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-
India (TAPI), the Pakistan-Qatar gas pipeline, and an ongoing project of LNG imports 
from Qatar. 
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Figure 11.  Transnational Gas Pipelines 
 
Source: Nazir Hussain, “Diplomacy and International Dimension of Energy 
Management,” in Solutions for Energy Crisis in Pakistan, ed. Mushir Anwar (Islamabad, 
Pakistan: Islamabad Policy Research Institute, 2013), 138. 
Similarly, the recent Chinese investment of $45.6 billion in the China-Pakistan 
Economic Corridor (CPEC) for infrastructure especially the trade routes, commonly 
referred as ‘Silk Roads,’ and energy projects is another significant development. Through 
this project, China will have an alternative route to bridge the Gulf energy, and Pakistan 
will yield significant economic benefits. Dr. Dhrubajyoti Bhattaacharjee, a research 
fellow at the Indian Council of World Affairs, writes: “The proposed economic corridor 
will connect the north-western Chinese province of Xinjiang with the Pakistani port of 
Gwadar through a network of roads measuring around 3,000 kilometers (1,800 miles), 
providing Pakistan its much needed economic infrastructure, especially power-generation 
plants.”74 The CPEC project will not only pacify Pakistan’s energy crisis, but will 
generate a lot of other economic activities and create job opportunities in the much-
neglected, poverty-ridden, and troubled Baluchistan Province. These economic activities 
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are likely to emerge as a major stabilizing factor and will harness the internal dissent in 
the province. 
Figure 12.  Silk Roads 
 
Source: BBC News, “Is China-Pakistan ‘silk road’ a game-changer?” April 22, 2015. 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-32400091  
A. THE PIPELINE PROJECTS 
Since the last two decades or so, Asia’s share in the world economy is constantly 
stepping up, and consequently, its appetite for energy resources is also increasing 
significantly. For India, China, and even most of the globe, the access to energy fields 
extending from the Pacific Ocean to Iran is through pipeline projects that pass through 
Pakistan. Pepe Escobar notes: “Pakistan is an energy-poor, desperate customer of the 
grid. Becoming an energy transit country is Pakistan’s once-in-a-lifetime chance to 
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transition from a near-failed state into an ‘energy corridor’ to Asia and, why not, global 
markets.”75 In Central Asia, Turkmenistan is ranked the number four gas producer after 
Russia, Iran, and Qatar. Central Asia is the world’s obvious focus because it sits on the 
earth’s biggest untapped reserves of oil and gas. 
1. Iran-Pakistan-India Gas Pipeline 
“The history of the IPI pipeline project can be traced back to 1988, when natural 
gas reserves were discovered at Pars Fields in Southern Iran.”76 However, in 2008, a tri-
country consensus was built to strike the final deal.77 In March 2010, a final agreement 
between Pakistan and Iran was inked at Ankara. India withdrew from the project, 
possibly due to strained U.S.-Iran relations and India’s apprehension about Pakistan 
being historic rivals. According to the outlined agreement, “IPI was to initially have a 
capacity to deliver roughly 22 billion cubic meters per year which was to evolve to a 
maximum of 55 billion cubic meters. Iran would initially transfer 30 mcm (750mcf) of 
gas per day to Pakistan but would increase to 60mcm per day.”78 However, due to the 
enormous twenty-two-year delay from conception to finalization of the project, the 
project’s cost had almost doubled—from $4 billion to $7.6 billion in 2010.79 As of today, 
its cost stands much higher. The operation of the pipeline will add 4,000 megawatts of 
cheaper electricity to the national grid and also reinstate approximately 2,200 megawatts 
of currently idle thermal power. Farooq Tirmizi writes, “Pakistan would pay US$3 billion 
a year to Iran, but it would reduce its oil imports by US$5.3 billion, resulting in a net 
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reduction in oil imports by around US$2.3 billion.”80 Moreover, if the project assumes 
multilateral status, then foreign exchange earnings, through royalties, will further reduce 
the country’s oil import bill.  
At present, India is excluded from the pipeline project, yet the project remains 
open to any third party participation at the later stage. It was proposed that, with India’s 
involvement in the project, the pipeline could be further extended up to China through 
Bangladesh. Any multilateral pipeline agreement will be a key to regional integration and 
a win-win situation politically, economically, demographically, and most importantly, 
from a regional security point of view. With recent improvements in U.S.-Iran relations, 
due to a possible U.S.-Iran nuclear deal, India’s return to the IPI project is a most likely 
proposition because of its growing energy needs. It is evident from the fact that “India is 
the world’s fifth-largest energy consumer; India is projected to rise to third-largest by 
2030, surpassing Japan and Russia.”81 According to an EIA case scenario, India’s 
principal energy demand is projected to swing to 1,299 MTOE in 2030, with an average 
annual growth rate of 3.6 percent per year.82 India’s current and projected needs provide 
reasonable grounds to become part of this project as soon as sanctions from Iran are lifted 
as a result of its possible nuclear deal with United States. 
2. Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India Gas Pipeline 
Commonly known as TAPI, this gas pipeline project was conceived in the mid-
1990s by the Union Oil Company of California (UNCOL). At the same time, Bridas 
Corporation, an Argentinean oil and gas giant, was working in parallel, on the same 
project.83 From 1995 to 1997, Bridas officials were in consultation were Turkmenistan, 
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Pakistan, and Afghanistan governments to convince these countries to join this trans-Asia 
gas pipeline project. However, the project ran into difficulties due to the emerging 
security scenario in the region. Lutz Kleveman writes: “The commercial competition 
between the UNOCAL and BRIDAS resulted into an open conflict between the two and 
ultimately ending the project as a result of the rise of Taliban and subsequently the 9/11 
episode and war on terror.”84 After the tragic incident of 9/11, both companies were less 
interested due to the region’s turmoil and unpredictable future.  
Despite all odds, in 2002, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Turkmenistan reached an 
agreement, signed at Ashgabad. Later, in 2006, equally energy-starved India also decided 
to formally join the project, primarily because the United States consented to its 
implementation. It is noteworthy that after signing TAPI, the Indian plea of abandoning 
the IPI gas pipeline project because of Pakistan’s domestic security situation and 
traditional rivalry with India does not hold water. The impact of the United States not 
joining IPI stands confirmed. After having built the consensus of all stakeholders, the 
Asian Development Bank (ADB) provided $100 million to conduct a feasibility study of 
this Trans-Asia gas pipeline project.85 Despite the willingness of all stakeholders to go 
ahead with the TAPI gas pipeline project and the United States’ consensus in the 
project’s favor, the construction of this megaproject could not commence due to a 
stalemate over Turkmenistan’s proposed financial terms and conditions.  
In October 2014, a significant development occurred when “Russian natural gas 
giant Gazprom announced that it would cease purchasing natural gas from 
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Turkmenistan.”86 In January 2015, as a follow up to its declaration, Gazprom 
significantly dropped the import of gas from Turkmenistan—by about two thirds. Taking 
advantage of Russia’s significant reduction of gas imports, China promptly exploited the 
opportunity and inked an agreement with Turkmenistan for constructing two additional 
pipelines (lines C and D), increasing the gas imports from Turkmenistan from the current 
35 to 65 billion cubic meter (bcm).87  
With a significant decrease in export of natural gas to Russia coupled with the 
threat of total cessation of Russian supplies, Turkmenistan has been forced to depend on 
China for its energy exports and revenue earnings. Realizing the danger of its sole 
economic dependence on China, Turkmenistan decided to diversify its export markets. 
Besides other options, TAPI seemed to be most feasible pipeline project. Therefore, 
Turkmenistan now seems willing to grant vital concessions, contrary to original financing 
terms, to kick-start the TAPI gas pipeline project. Despite reaching a consensus, the 
consortium leader’s selection is still pending. Big giants in the oil and gas sectors are 
reluctant to take the lead role in the TAPI project because Turkmenistan’s law prohibits 
private land ownership.88 
For Pakistan, implementation of the TAPI gas pipeline project will be a big 
breakthrough toward its economic sustenance. This project will generate approximately 
6,000 megawatts of gridded electricity.89 Besides easing out the energy crunch, this 
project will also create employment opportunities and Pakistan will earn millions of 
dollars on account of transit fees. The only opposition to this project comes from Russia, 
which despite significantly reducing its gas imports from Turkmenistan, still desires to 
route the pipelines to European markets through its own territory.90 Russian interests are 
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two-fold: economically benefitting from the transit revenues and keeping tabs on Central 
Asia’s rich energy basket, thereby maintain its influence in the region. 
3. Pakistan-Qatar Gas Pipeline 
Like most other pipeline projects, the Pak-Qatar gas pipeline project was also 
conceptualized in the 1990s and still lies short of implementation. The Sharjah-based 
Crescent Petroleum Company proposed this project, also known as the Gulf-South Asia 
(GUSA) gas pipeline project. The same international company was also willing to 
finance the project. A survey of the proposed route was also carried out by Crescent 
Petroleum, incurring a cost of US$4 million, after the signing of MOU between Pakistan 
and Qatar in July 2000.91 
The proposed project, still under consideration, is not cost-efficient because of 
high tariffs, the double cost of underwater route construction as compared to any land 
route, and costly maintenance. In 2012, Pakistan and Qatar inked a MOU for importing 
liquefied natural gas (LNG) to Pakistan. It is aimed at producing 2,500 megawatts of 
electricity, with a daily average import of 500 mcf. The current government is 
desperately perusing the LNG import project. On March 26, 2015, the first consignment 
ship carrying LNG anchored at the Karachi shore. After a lapse of six months, confusion 
still persists over the price issue—terms and conditions of contract have yet not been 
made public by the government. However, energy experts believe that despite the Qatari 
government’s willingness to trade at a reduced price of US$13–14 million British thermal 
unit (MBTU) instead of their initial demand of US$18 MBTU, the net cost of electricity 
generation will be more than what Pakistan is producing from diesel.92 The terms and 
conditions of the deal are not considered worthwhile, like keeping the current price 
frozen at the same rate for the next twenty years, whereas, a sharp decline in prices is 
being perceived in the next few years. Therefor the project runs contrary to the national 
interests, and seems to be only serving the bureaucratic interstes.93 The Pakistani 
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government’s effort to calm the severe energy crunch by importing Qatari LNG seems 
seriously flawed. It will raise electricity tariffs, compound the already crippling life of the 
common man, and cause industrial disorder and price hikes instead of providing much-
desired relief. This deal is testimony of the government’s institutional, political, and 
policy inefficiency.  
 Materialization of IPI and TAPI gas pipeline projects will add approximately 
10,000 MW of electricity to the national grid. These pipeline projects will substantially 
ease Pakistan’s energy shortfall burden and simultaneously strengthen its economy, by 
virtue of its energy corridor status. The pipelines’ importance is an undeniable factor, yet 
these projects alone will not help achieve the desired energy security. Therefore, eyeing 
the much desired diversified energy mix will remain a definite need. 
B. CHINA-PAKISTAN ECONOMIC CORRIDOR (CPEC) 
Envisioning the proposed CPEC, it may be appropriate to consider this economic 
corridor as an energy corridor. Out of a $46 billion commitment for this economic 
corridor, which equals almost 20 percent of Pakistan’s GDP, $34 billion will be utilized 
to generate approximately 17,000 megawatts of electricity. The remaining amount will be 
spent on upgrading infrastructure and supporting development.94 The amount of 
electricity generated through CPEC is almost double the amount of electricity that will be 
produced from both the IPI and TAPI gas pipeline projects, if they materialize. It is 
expected that by 2017, about 10,000 megawatts of energy will enter the current national 
grid. This energy contribution will be a vast mix of hydro, coal, solar, and wind energy.95 
The first phase of the project is already underway, and the 100-megawatt Quaid-e-Azam 
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Solar Park has already been inaugurated in Bahawalpur city of Punjab Province, which 
will be further extended to a 1,000-megawatt power plant.96 
Currently, Pakistan is engulfed with militancy issues, corruption scandals of high-
profile influential politicians, and most importantly, the situation in Baluchistan Province, 
which is pivotal for implementation of CPEC. Despite these odds, China’s huge 
investments speak of envisaged benefits as well as its transformed diplomatic objectives. 
In November 2014, the Chinese president spoke of “prioritizing the promotion of 
neighborhood diplomacy over the management of relations with other major powers.”97 
However, China needs to have friendly periphery if it needs to secure its energy needs. 
For Pakistan, the project has an enormous potential to support its dooming economy, 
especially a fast-track solution to its rampant energy crisis.  
With the possibility of easing out of sanctions against Iran, Beijing is also looking 
to benefit from the IPI pipeline project. As a part of CPEC, Beijing has already inked an 
agreement with Pakistan to link the Gwadar port with the existing domestic network of 
gas pipelines. Initially, this section of gas pipeline was to be built by Pakistan as part of 
the IPI project. This $2 billion pipeline construction project, including an LNG terminal 
construction at Gwadar, will be undertaken by the China National Petroleum Corporation 
(CNPC).98 It has significantly eased Pakistan’s pipeline financing issue, and now 
Pakistan will only have to construct the remaining 100 kilometers of pipeline from 
Gwadar to the Iranian border. Iran has already completed construction of its portion of 
pipeline. Not only Pakistan and China will benefit from an Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline, but 
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it will significantly impact the regional geopolitical calculus.99 Pakistan’s stance of not 
sending troops to Saudi Arabia and remaining neutral in the case of Saudi-Iranian conflict 
over Yemen is testimony to this impact. India’s re-entry into the project, after the 
sanctions over Iran are lifted, will be another significant milestone.  
The economic interdependence of Central and South Asian regions in general and 
South Asian countries in particular is in the making. In this scenario, the geostrategic 
location of Pakistan—at the confluence of South, West, and Central Asia—assumes 
greater significance. In its quest for energy and oil resources, this region is new Great 
Games’ center stage and Pakistan is the gateway to Central Asia. Stephen Cohn explains 
Pakistan’s significance: “While history has been unkind with Pakistan, its geography has 
been its greatest benefit.”100 Besides Russia, the two most populous and energy-desperate 
states, India and China, border Pakistan. 
By 2050, it is believed that natural gas consumption will surpass oil consumption 
as a main source of energy.101 Therefore, these transnational gas pipeline projects draw 
more attention, and achieving energy security through gas pipeline projects may become 
pivotal to national security for the countries involved. In this scenario, the significance of 
Pakistan as a transit economy is unmatched in the region. These projects, besides 
resolving age-long regional disputes among the stakeholders, “may also provide a 
peaceful atmosphere as well as bring an end to the arms race and ultimately help the 
countries in developing their health and education sector, eradicating poverty and 
unemployment.”102 
Undoubtedly, the regional security climate and trust deficiency remains a key 
hurdle to endorsing long sustainable partnerships in regional transnational gas pipeline 
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projects. May it be India, Pakistan, Iran, or Afghanistan, there has to be an end to the 
blame game and proxy war on behalf of the larger national and regional interests. There 
is a greater role to be played by the regional and extra-regional players in order to achieve 
regional security that will ultimately lead to achieving desperately needed energy 
security. In this regard, Zahid Anwar writes: “The prime objective of Pakistan’s foreign 
policy should be to develop beneficial and strong ties with all major powers and maintain 
cordial relations with its neighbors.”103 
Despite the regional countries’ desire and consensus, rivalries between the great 
powers in pursuing their regional interests, remains a difficult puzzle to solve. This 
geopolitical game of extra-regional players revolves around the United States, Russia, 
and China. These players aim at establishing their hegemony over the economy and 
energy resources of Central Asia and extending their sphere of influence in South Asia. 
Mankoff writes, “This power contest in the region is neglecting the security threats these 
weak, fragile states are facing which is victimizing the stability of the region.”104 For 
implementation of the perceived gas pipeline projects, regional stability is vital, which is 
only possible by giving it access to the world economy. Anjali and Jalil put it this way: 
“It must be remembered that ‘trade brings peace’ and this can act as precursor to ‘peace 
brings trade.’”105 These transnational pipeline projects can be realized if the extra-
regional influential powers like the United States, Russia, and China support them. 
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V. EXPERT OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
In the twenty-first century, the progressively more significant role of developing 
countries in global energy cannot be overemphasized. The International Energy Agency 
(IEA) projects that over 90 percent of increased energy demand and carbon dioxide 
(CO2) emissions growth between now and 2035 will be in nonmember countries of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). More so, $23 trillion 
of investment is required in the energy supply infrastructure of these countries.106 The 
trilemma of demand, supply, and investment in developing countries hinges upon various 
factors, including urbanization, population growth, an upcoming middle class, energy 
governance, investment policy incentives, and effects of energy subsidies. These energy-
starving countries, including Pakistan, still have a huge population with limited or no 
access to electricity: “By some estimates, as many as two billion other people in the 
developing world have very limited access to electricity, perhaps one appliance and 
several light bulbs.”107 This energy shortage extremely damages the quality of life. Per 
capita electricity utilization has a direct bearing on the number of human development 
activities: life expectancy, child development, educational standards, and access to clean 
drinking water. This phenomenon is explained in United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP) data in Figure 13.108 
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Source: For Human Development Index data, see United Nations Development Program, 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/. For Energy Development Index data, see 
http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/resources/energydevelopment/theenergydevelopmen
tindex 
Political stability and energy security are interdependent variables, and energy 
scarcity and resultant anemic economic development are detrimental to the country’s 
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national security and regional stability as well. Figure 14 explains the relationship 
between energy availability and security.109 
Figure 14.  Relationship between Energy and Security 
 
Source: Electrification rates as of 2009 from the IEA database in World Energy Outlook 
2011 Paris: OECD/IEA, 2011).  http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org 
/resources/energydevelopment/accesstoelectricity/. . 
                                                 
109 The Failed States Index is produced annually by the Foreign Policy and the Fund for Peace. The 
higher the numerical ranking, the more at-risk a country is. Countries with rankings above 90 are 
considered at very high risk. The data reflects the following categories: demographic pressures, movement 
of refugees or internally displaced persons, vengeance-seeking group grievance, chronic and sustained 
human flight, uneven economic development, poverty, sharp or severe economic decline, legitimacy of the 
state, progressive deterioration of public services, violation of human rights and law, security apparatus, 
rise of factionalized elites, and intervention of external actors. For more information on the Failed States 
Index, see http://global.fundforpeace.org/. 
 52 
A. ENERGY SECTOR GOVERNANCE 
For Pakistan, financial problems, incompetent leadership, managerial shortfalls, 
frail political institutions, and unimpressive foreign policy are the major obstacles in 
tackling the issue. Reforms required by Pakistan are not much different from what 
Charles and Banks propose for all developing countries: 
A variety of institutional reforms (legal, regulatory, and governance) is 
critical for developing countries if they are to expand energy access. The 
case of India provides a telling example. Although the blackout in 
northern India in August 2012, which left 600 million people without 
power, was blamed initially on technical and operational issues, 
longstanding institutional obstacles (bureaucratic red tape, arcane land 
acquisition processes, an overly complex regulatory system, coal 
transportation bottlenecks, corruption in coal leasing, inadequate upstream 
coal pricing, and heavily regulated retail electricity rates) played a much 
larger role. Expanding grid access in emerging market countries requires a 
policy framework that is conducive to private sector participation and that 
includes the implementation of an effective, independent regulatory 
regime; cost recovery in the tariff system; transparent subsidy regimes; 
and mechanisms for funding noncommercial grid expansion into lower 
income rural areas. The development of smaller-scale mini grids or micro 
grids in rural areas using distributed generation represents a major 
opportunity for areas where expansion of the national grid is prohibitively 
expensive and commercially unviable.110 
As U.S. secretary of state, Hillary Clinton highlighted good governance as a 
cornerstone of addressing energy poverty. A broad array of institutional, regulatory, and 
governance preconditions must be in place to support the expansion of electricity 
access.111 With the United States in the lead role, other developed countries should 
increase their support to implement reforms in the energy sector. Good governance will 
help build the trust of investors and encourage donors to respond to the call for investing 
in the energy sector. Charles K. Ebinger further elaborates: “The leadership in emerging 
market countries must be committed to ending corruption and to making serious 
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institutional and regulatory changes. The commitment must include phasing out subsidies 
to encourage energy efficiency and, above all, strengthening the rule of law, which is so 
vital to attracting private sector investments.”112 This commitment is, of course, a 
daunting task and, without objectively taking the pathway of good governance, any 
worthwhile objectives cannot be achieved. 
For Pakistan, institutional reforms can lay the foundation toward achieving energy 
self-sufficiency. Once put into effect, these reforms will guarantee efficient management 
of existing energy resources as well as judicious incorporation of renewable energy 
technologies. 
A viable institutional framework can only be put together when policymakers 
play their role in developing a consensus in greater national interest above and beyond 
their party and own self-interests. Similarly, the reorganization of the decision-making 
hierarchy in the energy sector is also a fundamentally needed reform. This issue of non-
centralized decision-making is not only specific to Pakistan and other developing 
countries, but it can also be traced equally in the developed economies of the world. Jan 
H. Kalicki and David L. Goldwyn write the following about the United States: 
Energy-related decision-making is, unfortunately, largely dysfunctional at 
the national and global levels. As with other issues, U.S. energy decision-
making has been built incrementally over time, with different 
responsibilities assigned to at least 10 different departments and agencies 
in the executive branch and with more than 30 congressional committees 
and subcommittees that more often reinforce shared turf with executive 
agencies than promote a unified strategic view.113 
However, the United States is not confronted with issues that are at the core of 
developing countries. Besides other institutional reforms needed for a workable national 
energy policy, there should be a unified decision-making apex body representing all 
energy-related institutions. Frank Verrastro and Kevin Book write: 
In an ideal world, the formulation of a comprehensive and balanced 
national energy policy would begin with timely and accurate data, 
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incorporate solid analysis, and then balance the tradeoffs required between 
competing or conflicting economic, security, and environmental 
objectives. Policymakers would share unbiased information to arrive at 
long-term strategic decisions to keep the nation on track. Flexible and 
adaptive rules and regulations would accommodate technology advances, 
foreign policy priorities, changing market conditions, and public 
sensitivities and perceptions.114 
Unfortunately, the present policy apparatus is exceedingly disjointed and totally 
reactive. Its devastating effects on economy and other walks of life are evident. The crisis 
situation can be greatly restored if energy-related functionaries are melded together. 
B. DOMESTIC ENERGY RESOURCES AND FINANCIAL ISSUES 
Countries like Pakistan, blessed with huge natural resources, are unable to plug 
the energy demand-supply gap due to lack of financial support from the international 
community. USGS-supported geological surveys in the Thar Desert of Pakistan show that 
it has coal reserves worth US$5,540 billion.115 The amount of energy that can be 
produced from this coal can meet the country’s need for years to come. However, the 
lack of finances for infrastructure development and water scarcity in the resource-rich 
desert prevent execution of such megaprojects. Unless institutional reforms are not in 
place, multinational companies or international organizations will be hesitant to support 
such projects. John P. Banks writes: “Most analyses indicate that the level of financial 
support required to provide electricity to everyone in the developing world must increase 
dramatically. … It is particularly incumbent on the world’s wealthiest economies to do 
more. … United States should lead in providing financial assistance in this endeavor.”116 
Developed economies the world over are based upon cheap energy sources, and 
coal is the most prominent source of energy. As of 2015, 40 percent of energy worldwide 
is still being produced from coal, despite environmental concerns. Dr. Shoukat Hameed 
Khan writes that despite the technological advances, coal will continue to remain a major 
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source of energy.117 However, the climatic effects due to carbon emission are not as 
devastating as perceived. For example, “the IEA states that achieving its ‘Energy for All’ 
scenarios would increase CO2 emission by 0.6 percent in 2030.”118 In this scenario, the 
major sources of energy still remain fossil fuels. If developed economies provide the 
financial support, assist in building the requisite infrastructure, and help in the transfer of 
technology for efficient combustion of coal, such as ultra-supercritical systems, Pakistan 
can substantially overcome its energy shortages without running counter to 
environmental concerns. 
C. CASE FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY 
In an effort to catch up with the developed world and diversify its energy mix, 
Pakistan needs to incorporate renewable energy projects. M. Farooq writes, “Pakistan has 
great potential for different kinds of renewable energies like solar thermal, biomass, 
wind, and hydel technologies.”119 However, despite launching the Renewable Energy 
Policy in 2006, no worthwhile contribution has been made in the energy sector.120 The 
reasons are twofold. The high cost of developing physical infrastructure and transmission 
and distribution systems, and the unavailability of capital investment with common 
people, coupled with high interest loans, render this form of energy unfeasible. Secondly, 
the governance issue—such as an absolute lack of coordination at all levels between 
policy makers, R&D organizations, banks, importers, and users—further complicates 
matters. Recently, the inauguration of the Quaid-e-Azam solar park and the installation of 
windmills in Sind Province as part of the CPEC project are positive steps in this 
direction. If the mistakes of the past are repeated and a pool of experts on renewable 
technologies is not created, despite financing through the CPEC project, the outcome is 
likely to remain dismal. 
                                                 
117Ahmed, “Solutions for Energy Crisis in Pakistan,” 247. 
118 Ebinger and Banks, “Electricity Access in Emerging Markets,” 341. 
119 M. Farooq and A. Shakoor, “Severe Energy Crisis and Solar Thermal Energy as a Viable Option 
for Pakistan,” Journal of Renewable and Sustainable Energy 5, no.1 (2013). Dr. M. Farooq is the 
Directorate of Quality Enhancement at Bahauddin Zakariya University in Multan, Pakistan. 
120 Ministry of Water and Power, “Policy for Development of Renewable Energy.” 
 56 
D. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (R&D) 
In Pakistan, lack of objective R&D is another missing link. In any long-lasting 
technological development, R&D plays a pivotal role. Institutional inadequacies and 
dependence on multinational institutions have always put indigenous R&D on the back 
burner. This practice in the energy sector has not only aggravated the deepening energy 
crisis, but it has drained the national exchequer, which is detrimental to Pakistan’s 
national economy. There is a dire need to create a conducive environment for public-
private partnerships in R&D projects. A huge amount of money is spent on energy-
related R&D projects in the leading economies of the world. 
E. FOREIGN POLICY, REGIONAL ENERGY PROSPECTS, AND 
NATIONAL SECURITY 
Most developed economies, even with an abundance of domestic energy 
resources, have to rely on the energy resources of other nations. Their successful, mutual 
interdependence can be best explained by the quality of foreign policy initiatives, which 
ultimately ensures national as well as regional security. Foreign policy plays a significant 
role in reaping the benefits of regional and trans-regional energy resources. In the case of 
Pakistan, all transnational gas pipeline projects, already discussed at length, have not only 
the prospect of meeting Pakistan’s energy needs, but of meeting the much-needed 
national and regional security and energy objectives. Foreign policy must be judiciously 
utilized and common grounds of mutual interest explored. Otherwise, the turf of energy 
may run counter to national interests. 
1. Energy Security vis-à-vis National Security 
Energy security has a direct bearing on national security. Daniel Yergin defines 
energy security as follows: “Objective of energy security is to assure adequate reliable 
supplies of energy at reasonable prices and in ways that do not jeopardize major national 
values and objectives.”121 This definition explains four different, but equally important, 
dimensions of the energy security: first, the adequacy of energy resources for present and 
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predicted future use; second, the assurance of not being subject to disruption in terms of 
duration or magnitude; third, the economic viability; and fourth, the non-compromise of 
national objectives. Defects in any of the above dimensions result in energy insecurity, 
which also runs counter to national security. Any of these four dimensions can be 
affected by domestic as well as external threats. External threats are more relevant to the 
level of foreign policy initiatives. Therefore, the national energy policy must have 
contingencies in place to deal with defects in any of these dimensions and must possess 
options, such as maintaining the Strategic Petroleum Reserves (SPR). 
2. Diplomacy of Pipelines 
For Pakistan, its inability to benefit from proposed transnational gas pipelines can 
mostly be attributed to ineffective foreign policy. Almost all of the transnational pipeline 
projects were conceived in the 1990s, but even after a lapse of almost a quarter of a 
century; these projects have not materialized. Pakistan must benefit from its geostrategic 
pivotal location and create a conducive environment, which Frank Verrastro calls the 
coalitions of the concerned. The objectives of Pakistan’s foreign policy should be 
twofold. First, it should be able to project Pakistan as a country serious about addressing 
its energy shortfalls. Of course, it requires contemplating and implementing reforms and 
good governance in the energy sector. Second, Pakistan’s foreign policy should utilize 
diplomatic channels to pursue regional energy alignment between the consumers and 
producers. These transnational pipeline projects, once implemented, will be a win-win 
situation for all stakeholders, and this economic interdependence will result in settling 
age-old disputes and help stabilize the region. Once this is achieved, it will surely change 
the life of millions of people currently living below the poverty line. 
F. UNIVERSITIES AND THINK TANKS 
Universities and think tanks can play an important role in energy conservation by 
developing model projects on campus and through public awareness campaigns. This 
may subsequently lead to outreach initiatives. Boston University in Massachusetts has 
achieved substantial results in energy conservation through the use of “LED lighting 
retrofits; occupying sensors; daylight-responsive lighting controls; de-lamping; and boiler 
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efficiency upgrade.”122 Similarly, universities should be funded to undertake student-led 
research on different energy pathways, and, together with think tanks, students should be 
provided opportunities to host workshops to foster awareness among the masses, media 
community, and industrial energy consumers. 
G. CONCLUSION 
Pakistan stands far away from developing an energy policy, which necessitates a 
total government approach as a precursor to achieving energy security. Without effective, 
implementable energy policy, Pakistan’s huge domestic potential for energy production 
cannot be utilized optimally. Big oil and gas giants will remain reluctant to invest in 
Pakistan unless a conducive security and investment environment is created. Similarly, 
effective integration of national and foreign policy with an economic and energy policy is 
a must for perfect utilization of domestic energy resources, benefiting from regional 
energy potentials, creating economic stability, and achieving broader national security.  
Some Pakistani energy experts opine that since Pakistan has enough coal reserves 
to meet its energy needs, it does not need to aspire to regional projects. This argument 
runs counter to the objectives of achieving energy and national security, energy equity, 
global climatic concerns, and diversification of Pakistan’s energy mix.123 Bennett 
Johnston writes: “In the longer term, progress toward regional infrastructure and 
eventually regional energy reserves can go far in helping highly diverse countries to 
navigate between the adversarial and the cooperative in Asia.”124 Therefore, the proposed 
regional gas pipeline and liquefied natural gas trade plans will cater to the ever-growing 
appetite of energy by the regional countries at market prices and will eventually 
accelerate region’s economic growth. Johnston believes that the “stronger the economic 
and energy foundation, the greater the growth and, ultimately, the peace of this 
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extraordinarily dynamic region will become.”125 The prime milestone of the progress of 
these bold initiatives will hinge upon the developed economies of the world, and the 
United States will have to assume leadership as mediator, stakeholder, bridge builder, and 
facilitator of multifaceted organizations. 
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APPENDIX A. STRUCTURE OF PAKISTAN’S POWER SECTOR126 
Non-existence of a single decision-making body has greatly affected the policy 
and decision-making, encompassing all facets of the energy sector. Different regulatory 
authorities in the structure of Pakistan’s power sector are described as follows:  
• Karachi Electric Supply Corporation (KESC), serving the city of Karachi 
and its adjoining areas (about 13–15 percent of Pakistan’s power market)  
• Water and Power Development Authority’s Power Wing (WAPDA), 
which serves the rest of the country 
Both utilities have owned and operated generation facilities, as well as transmission and 
distribution networks. KESC still operates as a separate, vertically integrated utility, but it 
is now predominantly in private hands, after 73 percent of the shares were sold to private 
investors in November 2005. WAPDA, however, was restructured into 15 incorporated 
entities, all of them state-owned, as follows: 
• Four thermal generation companies (GENCOs): (1) Jamshoro Power 
Generation Company (GENCO-1, 1024 MW installed/870 MW available), 
with headquarters at Jamshoro district Dadu, near Hyderabad in Sindh; (2) 
Central Power Generation Company (GENCO-2, 1655 MW/1400 MW), 
with headquarters at Guddu, district Jacobabad in Sindh; (3) Northern 
Power Generation Company (GENCO-3, 1856 MW/1700 MW), with 
headquarters at Muzaffargarh in Punjab; and (4) Lakhra Power Generation 
Company (GENCO-4, 150 MW/120 MW) at Khanote in Sindh 
• A National Transmission and Dispatch Company (NTDC), in charge of 
operating the transmission system (220-kV and 500-kV network) and 
performing a dispatch function; its headquarters are in Lahore, while the 
National Dispatch Center is in Islamabad 
• Nine electricity distribution companies (DISCOs), of which five are in the 
Punjab province (Islamabad Electricity Service Company—IESCO; 
Lahore Electricity Service Company—LESCO; Faisalabad Electricity 
Service Company—FESCO; Gujranwala Electric Power Company—
GEPCO; and Multan Electric Power Company—MEPCO); one in 
Balochistan (Quetta Electricity Service Company—QESCO); one in Sindh 
(Hyderabad Electricity Service Company—HESCO); one in Northwest 
Frontier Province (Peshawar Electricity Service Company—ESCO); and 
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one in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Tribal Electricity Service 
Company—TESCO) 




APPENDIX B. INSTITUTIONAL ORGANIZATION OF 







Source: “Policy for Development of Renewable Energy for Power Generation” (Minister 
for Water and Power, Government of Pakistan, 2006). 
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